Assuming that binary rank-and sign-dependent utility holds for gambles and that riskless choice utility can be constructed using the binary operation of joint receipt of consequences, there are four distinct measures of utility over gains: the two, one from gambles and the other from joint receipt, that arise by working with the trade-offs of just gains and the two that arise by working with the trade-offs of gains with losses. The problem is to discover testable behavioral properties that make the various pairs of measures identical. This is worked out completely, leading to six distinct properties. Three have previously been studied both theoretically and empirically: event commutativity, segregation, and duplex decomposition. Three are new and have not been studied empirically: joint receipt decomposition (for gains and for the mixed case) and joint receipt consistency. Similar issues and results hold for the utility of losses, where the mathematics is identical except for parameter values. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the results extend to general finite gambles and of some possible difficulties. ] 1996 Academic Press
BACKGROUND
The recent literature on utility theory includes an approach that attempts to combine within a single framework the concepts of the utility of gambles (uncertain alternatives) and the utility of sure consequences. The general purpose of this paper is to study their relations more fully.
Utility Based on Gambles
The approach based on preferences among gambles evolved from Ramsey (1931) , through von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954) , and summarized by Fishburn (1982) , to the more recent developments of rank-dependent utility, summarized by Quiggin (1993) and Wakker (1989) , and the rank-and sign-dependent models of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , called prospect theory, of Fishburn (1991, 1995) , and of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , called cumulative prospect theory. The modifications were motivated in large part by a mix of thought and empirical experiments that called into question the descriptive quality of their subjective expected utility theory predecessors. For a summary of some of the relevant empirical results see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Schoemaker (1982 Schoemaker ( , 1990 , and for a summary of many of the issues and ideas see Edwards (1992) .
One feature of the newer work on the utility of gambles, whose importance was first noted by Edwards (1962) and Markowitz (1952) , is that people make a significant distinction between gains and losses relative to a status quo position. In some cases, including some experiments that are cited later, it is reasonable to treat the status quo as no exchange of money, but in other cases it appears that some form of context-dependent aspiration level may be more appropriate (Fishburn, 1977; Fishburn 6 Kochenberger, 1979; Libby 6 Fishburn, 1977; Lopes, 1984 Lopes, , 1987 Luce, Mellers, 6 Chang, 1993 ). The first model of gambles that both placed significant emphasis on the status quo and attracted widespread attention was Kahneman's and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory.
Utility Based on Joint Receipts
An alternate approach to utility, much less fully developed, focuses only on the consequences without regard to chance events. The major structure that has evolved rests on the quite natural idea of joint receipt of receiving two (or more) entities at once. Although there was a little early empirical work on such an operation in psychology (Slovic 6 Lichtenstein, 1968; Payne 6 Braunstein, 1971 ) and later some in economics (Linville 6 Fischer, 1991; Thaler, 1985; Thaler 6 Johnson, 1990) , the main theoretical references are quite recent: Fishburn and Luce (1995) , Luce (1991 Luce ( , 1995 , Fishburn (1991, 1995) , and Thaler (1985) . Several empirical studies arising out of Luce and Fishburn's work are cited below.
The Four Measures of Utility
Consider only gains for the moment. Then four distinct ways to measure their utilities arise depending on whether binary gambles or binary joint receipts are used and on whether the trade-off studied is of gains versus gains or of gains versus losses (but focusing only on the gains aspect). An exactly parallel situation exists for losses, but because its mathematics is unchanged, except for parameters, I do not spell it out explicitly. Now, if utility really is a measurable concept some economists and many psychologists have strong doubts it seems unlikely that there should be more than one such measure. This issue is analogous to one that recurred in physical measurement where often one can measure the same physical attribute in more than one way. There one usually finds that there are linking laws showing that the several, apparently distinct, ways of measuring the attribute really are basically the same measure. A familiar example is mass. It can be measured using a pan balance by studying either how concatenations of masses behave or how the conjoint structure formed by varying volumes and homogeneous substances behaves. A distribution law links the concatenations to the conjoint structure, and one shows the latter measure of mass must be a power function of the former one, which is the best one can expect to do since multiplicative representations of conjoint structures are only unique up to positive power transformations (see Krantz, Luce, Suppes, 6 Tversky, 1971, Section 10.7; Luce, Krantz, Suppes, 6 Tversky, 1990, Sections 20.2.6, 20.2.7 and 22.7) .
The basic issue of this paper is to uncover comparable linking relations putative``laws'' that lead the above four measures of utility to reduce to a single measure.
Issues of Empirical Evaluation
Throughout the paper, we will also confront questions of empirical evaluation. It should be recognized that the issues are subtle, controversial, and not fully resolved. Most of the assertions we will focus on here concern indifference of preference: That two different formulations involving gambles and joint receipts are seen by subjects as indifferent to one another. A major difficulty is that, despite the fact that the theory stated here is algebraic, the behavior appears better described as probabilistic.
1 So single observations of preferences or indifferences cannot be taken at face value. That being the case, repeated observations of the same choice pair are required. Thus, if there are n stimuli and we wish to have m observations of each of the n 2 stimulus pairs, the size of the experiment can be formidable (e.g., with m=100 and n=50, a quarter of a million observations must be made which at a pace of 200 per hour session means 1,250 sessions!). One device to make experimentation practical is to work with certainty equivalents (CEs) to seek for each stimulus (gamble or joint receipt) in the experiment the sum of money that is seen as indifferent to it. Then the size drops to mn instead of mn 2 (for the above example, 25 sessions rather than 1,250).
The question then becomes one of accurately estimating CEs with as small a value for m as possible. Asking the subject to judge his or her CE surely keeps m small, namely, m=1 (in which case, all 50 CEs are easily obtained in a single session). But considerable evidence (Bostic, Herrnstein, 6 Luce, 1990; Birnbaum, 1992; Mellers, Weiss, 6 Birnbaum, 1992; Tversky, Slovic, 6 Kahneman, 1990) has convinced me that this method (and any modified choice method that invites the subject to use a judged CE) is not equivalent to a truly choice-based CE. In particular, establishing buying or selling prices is not the same as a choice CE. So I have been led to use a modified psychophysical method called PEST 2 which is considerably more efficient than collecting full psychometric function data. As we will see in Section 8.3, there are now reasons to be uneasy about the way PEST has been implemented in a number of experiments.
It should be added that because buying and selling are clearly of great social importance, it is essential to devise theories about how these prices are established, but that is not the purpose of this paper. Rather, I am focused on a single issue: If choice preferences can be represented numerically at all, then they can be represented in at least four distinct ways. When are these four ways basically the same?
Outline
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the four numerical representations that arise from gambles of gains, gambles of mixed consequences, joint receipt of gains, and joint receipt of mixed consequences. Section 3 examines the behavioral``law'' underlying a special property of many representations of gambles that is called``separability'' and that plays a significant role throughout. Section 4 amplifies some aspects of the rank-and sign-dependent representations that have arisen for gambles. Section 5 does the same thing for joint receipts and establishes the first pair of 298 R. DUNCAN LUCE 1 If so, why do we bother with algebraic theories? One reason is that we are able to formulate structural properties of interest algebraically that have, so far, eluded those attempting to construct probabilistic theories. One can hope that the algebraic models will prove to be the expected value version of the currently unknown random utility theories that ultimately should evolve.
2 PEST is an up down method in which a gamble is repeatedly compared but separated by many trials of other judgments with sums of money. The amount of money is increased or diminished depending upon whether the gamble or the money was selected as preferable. The step size is initially large, but each time the direction changes it is reduced, with the stopping rule being 1Â50 of the range of consequences in the gamble.
linking relations,``segregation'' and``joint receipt decomposition'' for gains, that lead to the utilities based on gains alone to be the same whether gambles or joint receipts are used. Section 6 treats comparably the utilities for mixed consequences, leading again to two linking relations,`d uplex decomposition'' and a mixed-case version of``joint receipt decomposition.'' Section 7 raises the question of the conditions under which the two joint-receipt measures, that based entirely on gains and that based on mixed gains and losses, are the same. Here the linking law is known as``joint receipt consistency.'' Section 8 is devoted to extensions from the binary case to general finite gambles, to a possible connection between joint receipt of lotteries and their convolution, and to some vexing empirical issues having to do with the monotonicity of joint receipt and whether our estimated CEs are order preserving. Section 9 provides a summary and lists some open problems.
THE REPRESENTATIONS IN QUESTION

Notation
Denote by C the set of consequences often money in the experimental literature and by E the set of chance events, where C & E=< often realized as a simple probabilistic device, such as a die or a pie-like disk with a spinner, with known probabilities. A distinguished consequence e # C is the status quo; distinguished events are the universal event 0 # E and the empty event < # E. From any x, y # C and any D, E # E, with D & E=<, we generate a binary gamble (x, E ; y, D), based on the occurrence of D _ E. This gamble is interpreted to mean that when the``experiment'' corresponding to D _ E is conducted, the consequence is x if E occurs and y if D occurs. When D _ E=0, so D=cE, the notation is often abbreviated to (x, E ; y). When the consequences are money and the event probability is known to the subject, we speak of a lottery rather than a gamble. As an illustration, suppose that the experiment is generated by a toss of a fair die, E=[1, 2], D= [3, 4, 5, 6] , x=810, and y=&85, then (x, E ; y)=(810, [1, 2] ; &85) means the lottery in which one wins 810 if either face 1 or 2 comes up on the toss, which happens with probability 1Â3, and loses 85 for any other face.
Let G denote the union of C and the set of all binary gambles that can be generated recursively from C and E. Thus, for example, if x, y, z # C, then (x, E ; y) is a binary gamble and ((x, E; y), D; z) is a compound binary gamble. The convention followed here and later is that each occurrence of an event symbol denotes the outcome of an independent realization of the chance``experiment'' underlying the gambles. This can be somewhat misleading when an event, such as E, recurs several times: In ((x, E ; y), E ; z) the consequence is x if E occurs on both of two independent realizations of the underlying experiment, y if E occurs on the first and cE on the second, and z if cE occurs on the first. In cases where I think added specificity would help, I write E$ and E" to mean E occurs on independent replications of the underlying experiment.
Let Ä be a binary operation on G, where for g, h # G we interpret g Ä h as the receipt of both g and h their joint receipt (JR). Examples are gifts on a holiday, checks and bills in the day' s mail, and sets of purchases. We let G 
g=(x, E; y), x e, y e]
g=(x, E; y), x e, y e].
Elementary Assumptions
We make several assumptions which seem natural under the foregoing interpretations (Luce, 1992b (Luce, , 1995 :
is a weak order. (Hence tis an equivalence relation.)
(ii) Certainty equivalents: \g # G c _x # G such that xt g. Such an x, known as the certainty equivalent of g, is denoted by CE( g).
(iii) Non-triviality: _x, y # C such that x o eo y.
(ii) Identity of Ä : eÄ gt g Ä et g.
Note that by A1(ii) and A2(iii), it is sufficient to study Ä over C c because a gamble can be replaced by its certainty equivalent. This property, which rests primarily on the monotonicity of Ä, may well be stronger than it seems and, what is worse, it may be wrong. Cho and Luce (1995) have reported data where it appears that either our estimates of CEs are not order preserving or Ä is not monotonic. More discussion on this point appears in Section 8.3. For now, we assume methods for which there is no problem in these assumptions.
A3. \x, y # C, \D, E # E, (i) Idempotence of gambles: xt(x, E; x).
(ii) Null event in gambles: yt(x, < ; y).
(iii) Complementarity of gambles: (x, E; y)t (y, cE; x).
(iv) Monotonicity of consequences: (x, E; e) (y, E; e) iff x y.
(v) Monotonicity of events: \x, y e or \x, y e, (x, D ; e) (x, E ; e) iff ( y, D ; e) ( y, E ; e).
(vi) Restricted solvability:
(a) If xÄ , x Ä # C are such that (xÄ , E ; e) g (x Ä , E ; e), then _x # C such that (x, E ; e)tg.
A controversy has arisen over the monotonicity of consequences (A3(iv)) when the order among gambles is judged by estimated CEs with Birnbaum (1992) and Mellers et al. (1992) claiming evidence of trouble when one of the consequences is e and von Winterfeldt, Chung, Luce, and Cho (1996) claiming that with different estimates of CEs there is no problem.
The Several Representations
The following order preserving representations have arisen in the literature: 
It is well known that, for suitably dense C and E, the constraint (1a) means that U 1 is unique up to a positive linear transformation and that adding (1b) forces it to be unique up to multiplication by a positive constant U 1 forms a ratio scale. 
Note that if, for some E, W 
Note by the monotonicity of Ä (A2(iii)) that U 3 is bounded from above by C. Equation (3b) follows from Eq. (3a) by setting g=e and using A1(iii) and A2(ii).
The reason for the name``negative exponential utility'' is that the transformation V a =&ln(1&U 3 ÂC) is additive, i.e.,
Thus, U 3 =C[1&e &Va ] is the negative exponential function of an additive representation of ( G +c , , Ä, e). Thus, U 3 and C have the same unit, and so the representation is unique up to multiplication by a positive constant. It may seem unusual to consider a non-additive representation when an additive one exists, but it is not unprecedented to do so when the non-additive one relates more simply to the representations of other related structures. We shall see that this is true in the present context. The bestknown example of using a non-additive representation when an additive one exists is the relativistic velocity``addition'' formula:
This velocity measure exhibits the expected relation s=vt, where s is distance traversed in time t at velocity v. One of the several drawbacks of the corresponding additive representation, called``rapidity,'' is its failure to have a simple relation to distance and time. 
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By A2(ii), Eq. (4b) follows from (4a). Once again, under suitably density restrictions Eq. (4a) limits one to an interval scale and Eq. (4b) narrows it to a ratio scale.
These four representations are summarized in Table 1 for handy reference.
The aim of the paper is to understand the conditions under which these four utility measures on gains are the same measure. The case for losses is similar. In the process, it will become apparent how to axiomatize the common measure. Note that once this is done, it is easy to see that except for A1(ii) and (iii) and A3(vi), which are existential statements, Assumptions A1 A3 follow from the representations.
SEPARABLE UTILITY OF BINARY GAMBLES
We begin with the general concept of a separable utility function. It serves as an important condition throughout the paper, but unlike the other measures that are tied down to one-parameter (ratio scale) transformations, separable utility is unique only up to two-parameter (power) transforms of the form U Ä :U ; .
Definition 5. A utility function U : G Ä R is separable iff there exist weighting functions
Separability is a property of many utility theories, including not only the weighted averages of Eqs. (1a) and (2a) but also many that are not simple weighted averages. See the broad class of models in Luce (1992a) .
Separability and the Thomsen Condition
The existence of a separable representation (Definition 5) of gambles of the form (x, E ; e) simply means that the conjoint structure ( C_E, $), where (x, D) $ ( y, E) (x, D; e) ( y, E; e), has an additive representation. We know a good deal about the existence of such representations (see Krantz et al., 1971, Chap. 6) . In addition to what we have assumed in A3, there are two important additional necessary properties. The first is a version of the Thomsen condition: for x, y, z # C and D, E, F # E, (x, F ; e)t(z, E; e) and (z, D ; e)t( y, F; e)
O (x, D ; e)t( y, E ; e).
The second is a form of Archimedeaness which, although easily formulated, is not really needed here. My goal here is to find a simpler form than Eq. (6) for testing the Thomsen condition.
Status-quo Event Commutativity
The relevant property turns out to be one whose interest and significance was noted at least as early as Ronen (1971 Ronen ( , 1973 .
The special case with y=e in Eq. (7) is called status-quo event commutativity. (Recall the convention that D and E are from independent realizations of an experiment.) Equation (7) formulates a condition that is clearly rational in the sense that both sides have the same``bottom line'': one receives x if both D and E occur on independent realizations of the underlying chance experiment, and receives y otherwise. The two compound gambles are actually the same gamble if the order of occurrence of D and E is ignored.
satisfies status-quo event commutativity and Archimedeaness, 4 then there is a separable representation (Eq. 5) of G that is unique up to power transformations.
Proofs of all theorems can be found in the Appendix.
Relevant Data
Tversky (1967) collected data on gambles of the form (x, p ; e) from prisoners where consequences C were numbers of cigarettes. He showed by construction that a separable representation existed with, however, a weighting function W that definitely was not finitely additive.
The property of event commutativity has been studied several times. Ronen (1971 Ronen ( , 1973 5 studied status-quo event commutativity with xo e where subjects made direct choices between the two forms; in Experiment 1 many of the subjects recognized that the pairs of gambles had the same expected value and in Experiment 2 they were informed of this. The choice was forced and a substantial fraction of subjects selected the alternative with the greater probability of advancing to the second gamble. Forcing a choice, of course, invites the subjects to seek a distinguishing feature, and the order of the events really is the only one available. Brothers (1990) studied general ( y{e) event commutativity in several different ways: direct comparisons, judged certainty equivalents (CEs), and PEST-determined CEs for lotteries. His results were mixed, but provided the greatest support for Eq. (7) in the third experiments that used both PEST CEs and directly judged CEs. He studied both x>y and y>x and found no difference. Chung, von Winterfeldt, and Luce (1994) carried out a more elaborate version of Brother's PEST approach and found event commutativity well confirmed for 22 out of 25 subjects.
Reduction of Compound Lotteries
Observe that, for all x # C + and D, E # E,
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, F(x, D, E) depends on x only to the extent of its sign, and indeed in terms of Eq. (5)
When the gambles are described only in terms of event probabilities with p=Pr(E), then we write (x, p ; e) for (x, E ; e).
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, consider gambles of the form (x, p ; e). Suppose that, for every p # [0, 1], there exists E # E with Pr(E)= p and that (x, p ; e) (x, q ; e) iff either x o e and p q or x O e and p q.
Note that the property F k ( p, q)= pq is a rationality condition prescribed by classical probability theory.
RANK-AND SIGN-DEPENDENT UTILITY OF BINARY GAMBLES
Some Background on the Rank-Dependent Representation
As noted in Section 1, there is a half century of history of seeking order-preserving utility representations of gambles that involve weighted sums of the utilities of the consequences. Initially these weights were taken to be the objective probabilities of the events yielding expected utility (von Neumann 6 Morgenstern, 1947; for a number of subsequent variants see, e.g., Fishburn, 1982) . In the next line of development, (subjective) probabilities of events were constructed from the preference behavior (Savage, 1954) Again, there were a number of subsequent variants. In the 1980s a variety of rank-dependent models were developed with the notable feature that the weight assigned to an event depended not only on that event but on the rank-order position of the associated consequence relative to the other consequences that can arise in the gamble. A number of these models are summarized by Quiggin (1993) and some by Wakker (1989) . Unlike the earlier models, these weights were not probabilities. Indeed, in the simplest case where the events have associated probabilities p i and the numbering i runs from the most preferred to the least preferred consequence, the weight on event j is of the following form:
gives, under f, the incremental impact of cumulative probabilities.
All models mentioned above have the property that U forms an interval scale in the sense that for some constants k>0 and c, U* is another representation iff U*=kU+c. Indeed, Luce and Narens (1985) showed that among the class of binary models that are unique up to interval scale transformations, the most general form is rank dependent. Much greater freedom exists for theories in the ratio scale case. 
Some Features of Rank-Dependent Utility
First, it is obvious that rank-dependent utility (RDU) is separable. Of course, this means that status-quo event commutativity must hold.
Second, RDU implies general event commutativity. The proof is a simple calculation: Assume x y, then using A3(i and iv) (x, E; y) ( y, E, y)t y,
For x O y, one uses the second part of Eq. (1a).
Third, consider what, in a sense, is the next more complex (possible) indifference 7 among compound gambles after event commutativity, Definition 7. (G, ) is right autodistributive iff for all x, y, z # C and E # E, ((x, E; y), E; z)t((x, E; z), E; ( y, E; z)).
(Recall the convention about repeated events mentioned in Section 2.1. ) Note that Eq. (10) is a rational indifference in the sense that both sides have the same bottom line: x if E occurs in both experiments, y if E occurs in one experiment and cE in the other, and z otherwise. The only difference is the order in which E and cE occur. As Luce and von Winterfeldt (1994) demonstrated, complementarity (A3(iii)), rank dependence, and right autodistributivity imply that the weights are finitely additive. Thus, in particular, 1&W + (cE) can be replaced by W + (E), thereby losing rank dependence and reducing the model to binary subjective expected utility (SEU). This means that event commutativity (Eq. 7) and right autodistributivity (Eq. 10) define a sharp division between RDU and SEU. As noted earlier, the latest data obtained under carefully controlled experimental conditions seems to support event commutativity, whereas Brothers, (1990) data exhibited major violations of right autodistributivity.
Rank-and Sign-Dependent Utility
Slightly prior to the flurry of work on RDU models, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a model of restricted scope that was both rank and sign dependent in the sense of Table 1 and for which, over gains and over losses, separately, U 1 =U 2 . This model has attracted a good deal of attention, and it was later generalized to arbitrary finite gambles by Fishburn (1991, 1995) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . The former called it 303 UTILITY MEASURES rank-and sign-dependent utility (RSDU); the latter called it cumulative prospect theory. 8 Wakker and Tversky (1993) provided an axiomatization for their version of the model that followed traditional lines of working only with a preference order over gambles. As with Wakker's (1989) earlier work on RDU models, this axiomatization has the drawback that the axioms make sense only if one is aware of the rank-dependent nature of the intended representation, and even then the axioms seem somewhat contrived. Fishburn (1991, 1995) approached the issue of axiomatization differently by introducing joint receipt as a primitive, axiomatizing ( C c , , Ä, e) and then showing how to go from that to the RSDU form. In various ways their treatment was not fully satisfactory, and part of the motive for this paper is to fill in some gaps while making clear the entire structure of ideas.
Some Features of RSDU
The unusual feature of RSDU is the representation for binary gambles with both a gain and a loss, namely, Eq. (2a), in which the weights do not necessarily add to 1. This is a decided non-rationality of the theory. We see that the first term on the right, First, the sign-dependent expression also implies that U 2 is separable, as was U 1 .
Second, monotonicity of preference across e implies U 1 =U 2 .
The remainder of the paper focuses on the joint receipt primitive: its axiomatization, its relation to RSDU, and its providing a fairly natural axiomatization of RSDU.
THE NEGATIVE EXPONENTIAL REPRESENTATION OF GAINS JOINT RECEIPT
Evidence in Support of Joint Receipt of Gains Being an Extensive Structure
As was noted, the negative exponential representation can always be transformed into an additive one, Eq. (3c), which means that, in addition to satisfying A2,
positiveness, gÄ h o g and h; and Archimedeaness, namely, for each g, h # G + , with h o e, _ integer n such that nh g, where 1h=h and nh=(n&1) hÄh. It is well known that adding a condition of solvability yields a sufficient condition for an additive representation (Krantz et al., 1971, Theorem 3.3, p. 85, restricted to a closed operation). Such qualitative structures are called extensive.
Note that although I state the theory in terms of ( G +c , , Ä, e) it is really sufficient to study ( C +c , , Ä, e) because, by assumption, a gamble can always be replaced by its CE (A1(ii) and A2(iii)).
One question is the degree to which the above properties are supported by data. For money consequences, at least, the solvability condition seems approximately correct. One's experience with joint receipts intuitively supports the idea that Ä is commutative and associative, at least for gains and losses separately. The following data exist. Thaler (1985) had subjects answer a questionnaire about how à`t ypical person'' would react to certain schematic, realworld scenarios. From these group data, he argued, not entirely convincingly in my opinion, that subjects either integrate two monetary consequences as x+ y and evaluate U(x+ y) or segregate 9 them as U(x)+U( y), whichever is better. That is,
His data suggested segregation for gains, integration for losses, and a more complex pattern for mixed gains and losses. Fishburn and Luce (1995) worked out a description of the boundaries in the mixed case on the assumption that U is concave for gains and either concave or convex for losses. Later empirical work by Linville and Fisher (1991) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) paint a more complex picture, but the scenarios used involve time delays that make the interpretation problematic within a timeless framework. Cho and Luce (1995) used the experimental procedure PEST 10 to determine the CEs of money lotteries and their joint receipts when presented as pie diagrams on a computer. Our data were unambiguous: for the joint receipt of sums of money with either both gains or both losses, x Ä y=x+ y. (Unfortunately, we did not explore the mixed case.)
Given that Ä=+ for gains, it is easy to see from Eq. (3c) that for some c>0, V a (x)=cx, and so
This form plays a role in Section 5.4. One argument against using joint receipt (e.g., by Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) is that if the joint receipt structure is extensive with Ä=+, then the additive representation V a is proportional to money, and this flies in the face of all sorts of evidence of diminishing marginal utility for gains. The question is whether one should think of V a as a utility, especially the utility that arises from studying gambles. We turn to this now.
The ideas and results of this subsection are adapted from Fishburn (1991, 1995) .
This property is rational in the sense that the bottom line on both sides is the same: One receives g Äh if E occurs and hte Ä h if E fails to occur.
We note that the apparent asymmetry of the definition is illusory:
[A2(i) and A3(iv)]
Segregation has been examined experimentally by Cho. Luce, and von Winterfeldt (1994) and by Cho and Luce (1995) and has, within the noise level of their data, been sustained.
The following property follows immediately from Eq. (3a) and it captures, in part at least, the idea that the utility function for gains should exhibit diminishing marginal utility for money.
Definition 9. A utility function U : G Ä R is weakly concave for gains iff for all x # G + ,
Theorem 2 (Adapted from Luce 6 Fishburn, 1991 . Suppose ( G +c , , Ä, e) satisfies assumptions A1 A3. Then any two of the following three conditions implies the third:
(i) The structure satisfies segregation (Eq. 12).
( Three major implications of this theorem are as follows: First, within this framework, the boundedness of U is tied up with weak concavity. For U to be unbounded, it must not be weakly concave, which can mean either weakly convex or mixed concave and convex intervals. Second, segregation, weak concavity, plus RDU (including, of course, SEU as a special case) imply the negative exponential representation, so U 1 =U 3 and this common utility function is separable. Third, segregation plus ( G + , , Ä) being an extensive structure yields a fairly natural axiomatization of the rank-dependent utility representation for binary gambles provided that we have reason to believe there is a negative exponential representation of the extensive structure that is also separable. So, an important task, which is taken up next, is to seek empirical conditions that insure this connection.
Separable Negative Exponential Utility and Joint Receipt Decomposable Gains
We seek an empirically testable property that assures us that some utility function over joint receipts having the form of Eq. (3) is also separable. To that end, consider:
Definition 10. (G +c , , Ä, e) is said to be joint receipt decomposable ( for gains) iff for all x # C + and E # E, _D=D(x, E) # E such that for for all y # C + , (x Ä y, E; e)t(x, E; e) Ä ( y, D; e).
Theorem 3. If U is separable (Eq. 5), with W + : E wwÄ onto [0, 1], and negative exponential (Eq. 3), then the structure satisfies joint receipt decomposability (Eq. 14).
The event D relates to x and E in the representation as follows. With no loss of generality set C=1 in Eq. (3), then in the proof we show that D is defined by ( &V a ) and U$=1&exp( &V$ a ).
By the well known uniqueness theorem for additive representations of an extensive structure, we know that for some :>0, V a =:V$ a , and so
Now it is reasonably obvious (see proof ) that for :{1, both U and U$ can not be separable. So the question we must face is this: Suppose there is a separable V and a U that satisfies the negative exponential property, Eq. (3a); is there then a V* that both is separable and satisfies Eq. (3a)? By the uniqueness theorem for additive conjoint structures, we know that the only transformations of V that maintain separability and monotonicity are V ; , ;>0, and so if such a V* exists it must be of the form V ; . The gist of the next theorem is to show that such a ; exists when the structure satisfies Eq. (14). We continue to seek a proof that requires only the strict monotonicity (and so continuity) of F, but not its differentiability which seems extraneous to the issues being addressed.
Tversky and Kahneman's Estimate of Weighting Functions
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) pointed out that data from lotteries of the form (x, p ; e) plus separability allow one to estimate W k ( p) as a function of p and k, where k=+, & according to whether x # C + or x # C & . In particular, they noted that by separability and A1(ii), U[CE(x, p ; e)]ÂU(x)=W k ( p). This yields an estimate of W k if one knows U. To that end, they assumed U is a power function, estimated the powers :(k), and used [CE(x, p ; e)Âx] :(k) as the estimate 12 of W k ( p). The flaw in this approach is that if one accepts RDU (which they do), segregation (which has some empirical support), weak concavity (which is rarely questioned 13 ), and Ä=+ (which they clearly believe and which also has empirical support), then by Theorem 2 the correct form for the utility function is not a power but the negative exponential of Eq. (11). Simple calculations make clear that the difference in estimates of W k can be considerable, and hence we may have been significantly misled about the form of W k by their estimates.
For example, Table 2 provides a calculation for the average of two subjects both of whom satisfy the rational model 14 in which p ; is the form of the weighting function, one with ;=1Â2 and the other with ;=3Â2. It is clear that the average is unlike either subject and that it overshoots small probabilities and undershoots large ones, as reported by Tversky and Kahneman. This problem bears careful reexamination, and at this point one should be very cautious about what form to assume for W k ( p). I believe that whatever family of functions is assumed for a descriptive W k , it should 15 include as a special case the rational form of Eq. (9), namely, a power of p. Neither Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) nor Karmarkar's (1978 Karmarkar's ( , 1979 ad hoc formulas include Eq. (9) as a special case.
Segregation and Event Commutativity
Earlier I showed that status quo event commutativity was key to separability and that the rank-dependent form implied general event commutativity. Here I show still another tie.
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11 Because U and V are each order preserving, F must be strictly increasing and so F &1 exists. 12 It is worth noting that their Fig. 3 which claims to be a plot of W k ( p) versus p is, in reality, a plot of CE( g)Âx versus p, uncorrected by the power. When that correction is made, the plots are rather more symmetric. Indeed, using slightly different estimates of the power for the utility function than they did, one can easily fit to them the perfectly symmetric Karmarkar (1978 Karmarkar ( , 1979 function. 13 One exception is the empirical study of Chechile and Cooke (1996) which, taken at face value, strongly suggests a convex utility function for gains. This may be misleading, however, because the experimental method involved obtaining judged probabilities that made one lottery indifferent to another one. This method may, as judged CEs seem to, provide biased estimates as compared to choice-based ones. Until some methodological work is carried out, one must be cautious.
14 See Section 3.4 and Eq. (9). 15 The rule I try to adhere to is that descriptive theories should not preclude the rational ones, but only generalize them.
Theorem 5. If ( G +c , , Ä, e) satisfies status quo event commutativity (Eq. 7 with y=e) and segregation (Eq. 12), then it satisfies event commutativity for any x, y # C + with x y.
It is unclear whether we should or should not expect event commutativity to hold for y ox. The data of Chung et al. (1994) and Ronen (1971 Ronen ( , 1973 were run only with xo y. In the best of Brothers, (1990) experiments, 3, both xo y and xO y were studied and appeared little different.
THE ADDITIVE REPRESENTATION FOR MIXED JOINT RECEIPTS
Axiomatization of Mixed Joint Receipts
The existence of the additive representation of Eq. (4) can be understood if we replace (G, , Ä, e) by the conjoint structure (
In particular, monotonicity is assumed in A2(iii). The Thomsen condition asserts that
Clearly, this condition should be checked empirically; it has not been. Non-triviality holds because of A1(iii). Solvability takes the form that if gÄ
& . This condition certainly seems plausible for money gambles. Finally, a form of Archimedeaness is assumed, which we need not spell out. Thus the main experimental test is of the Thomsen condition.
We next explore how this additive representation relates to the sign-dependent one for gambles with mixed consequences, Eq. (3). And following that we look into the issue of when the additive representation of joint receipts is separable.
An alternative approach, studied in Luce (submitted), should be mentioned. One could assume that associativity holds for mixed consequences as well as for all gains and all losses, i.e., that the entire joint receipt structure forms an Archimedean ordered group and so has an additive representation V a throughout. The relation to gambles is unchanged for gains, but it is substantially different for the mixed case. I do not attempt to describe the differences here. Suffice it to say that we do not currently know which is the better model for mixed consequences.
6.2. Duplex Decomposition, Separability, and U 2 =U 4
The major empirical property linking additive mixed joint receipts and sign-dependent utility of binary gambles with mixed consequences that was used by Luce and Fishburn (1991) is:
where E$ and E" are both occurrences of the event E in independent realizations of the underlying chance experiment.
In contrast to the other empirical properties that have been introduced, this one lacks a rational basis. The bottom line on the left, in which either x + or y & but not both must occur, differs from the bottom line on the right where, in addition, x + Ä y & and eÄ ete can also occur. Duplex decomposition is a rule of thumb that says: replace a mixed gamble by the joint receipt of the gains part and of the losses part, independently evaluated. Despite its nonrationality, it has found empirical support in experiments. The first to note it, and name it, were Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) , who found it supported when the two gambles were displayed as pie diagrams that were presented simultaneously. Payne and Braunstein (1971) also studied it. More recently Cho et al. (1994) explored it fairly systematically, using PEST-determined CEs, and again found support for it.
Theorem 6. Suppose a structure of binary gambles satisfies Assumptions A1 A3. Then any two of the following properties imply the third:
(i) Duplex decomposition (Eq. 16).
(ii) U has a binary sign-dependent utility representation (Eq. 2).
(iii) U is separable (Eq. 5) and additivity of mixed joint receipts (Eq. 4) holds for all g 
THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE TWO JOINT RECEIPT MEASURES
From what has been proved, we know that if A1 A3, segregation (Eq. 12), and duplex decomposition (Eq. 16) are satisfied, then U is both separable (Eq. 5) and a negative exponential function for gains (Eq. 3) iff U is separable (Eq. 5) and additive over mixed joint receipts (Eq. 4). This follows from Theorems 2 and 5 along with the consequence monotonicity of Assumption A3(iv). The question considered here is what empirical condition involving just joint receipts and not gambles is equivalent to U being both negative exponential for gains and additive for mixed consequences. Basically, the key property was formulated as (J7$) in Luce and Fishburn (1991) . Using a functional equation argument, we show here that this is indeed exactly what is needed.
Definition 13. The structure (G c , , Ä) is said to be joint receipt consistent if the following condition is satisfied. Suppose for some x, y # C + and r, s
Theorem 8. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A2 hold, U is negative exponential (Eq. 3) for gains, and V is additive for mixed joint receipt (Eq. 4). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Joint receipt consistency is satisfied.
(ii) Over gains and with r, s, and y as in Definition 13, either (a) V is additive over the entire structure and s=r or (b) V is negative exponential and for some B>0,
In (ii)(a), if V is separable, then U cannot be separable; and in (ii)(b) if U and V are both separable and agree at one point, then U=V.
Note that in the case of (ii)(a), the operation Ä is associative throughout, not just for gains and losses separately. Thus, this solution could be rejected empirically if it is shown that, for mixed gains and losses, associativity fails. As noted earlier, the purely associative case has been studied in Luce (submitted) and a student is currently developing an empirical study.
For losses, an exactly parallel property is defined and the relations between U and V are exactly parallel.
Joint receipt consistency has not been examined empirically.
RELATED ISSUES
Extensions to Finite Gambles
The work described above has the limitation that it does not apply to general gambles with more than two consequences. (Of course, the same was true of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979.) One of the goals of Fishburn (1991, 1995) , Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , and Wakker and Tversky (1993) was to provide a generalization to a general rank-and sign-dependent form. The version given by Luce and Fishburn (1995) has been considerably simplified and improved by Liu (1995) . This approach is easily outlined.
Any general gamble can be partitioned into three subgambles: g + consists of all gains and so is defined on E + , the union of all events E k with g k o e ; g & which consists of all losses defined on E & ; and the status quo e defined on E 0 . One behavioral postulate is that such a partition is indifferent to the original gamble,
Assuming Eq. (19) and consequence monotonicity (A3v), then two applications of Eq. (2) first to the partition
The term involving e as a consequence does not appear because U(e)=0. The remaining postulates concern the terms g + and g & . We deal explicitly only with g + ; the discussion for g & is similar. The fundamental idea is first to order the events of g + starting with the one that gives rise to the most preferred consequence and ending with the one giving rise to the least preferred consequence, i.e.,
where
+ and x 1 ox 2 o } } } ox n oe. Next, one assumes that
where E(n&1)=E 1 _ E 2 _ } } } _ E n&1 and g + n&1 the subgamble of g + restricted to E(n&1). The empirical validity of Eq. (21) has never been checked experimentally.
Assuming Eq. (21), one then applies Eq. (1a), thereby reducing the analysis of U(g + n ) to that of U(g + n&1 ) Care must be taken to normalize the weights according to the conditioning event, first E + , and then E(n&1), etc. One proceeds inductively and by doing a bit of algebra determines the form of the resulting weighting function. It is rank dependent because the order of the induction matters and it is determined by the ordering of the consequences.
So, assuming that Eqs. (19) and (21) are empirically valid, the theory can be extended to general finite gambles.
Joint Receipt and Convolution
Consider the lotteries g=(x 1 , p 1 ; x 2 , p 2 ; ...; x m , p m ) and h=( y 1 , q 1 ; y 2 , q 2 ; ...; y n , q n ), where p j = q k =1 and, in general, m{n. The equivalent (but not automatically indifferent) first order lottery to g Äh takes the form (x 1 Ä y 1 , p 1 q 1 ; ...; x j Ä y k , p j q k ; ...; x m Ä y n , p m q n ). We note that segregation (Def. 8, Eq. 12) is the special case of asserting that indifference holds when m=2, x 2 =e, and n=1, so h= y. If, as seems to be true, Ä=+ over money gains, then this first-order form reduces to the convolution g V h=(x 1 + y 1 , p 1 q 1 ; ...; x j + y k , p j q k ; ...; x m + y n , p m q n ).
So, one natural hypothesis to investigate is whether
Luce (1995) argued that we cannot expect to find anyone who satisfies Eq. (23) and is monotonic in V who also finds attractive a lottery g with a negative expected value, i.e., EV( g)<0 and g o e. The reason is this: Let g (n) denote the convolution of g with itself n times; then if Ä=V is monotonic, a simple induction shows g (n) o e. But because EV( g (n) )=nEV( g) and SD(g (n) )=-n SD(g), the standard error decreases as 1Â-n, and so it is difficult not to believe that, for sufficiently large n, g (n) O e. Because people can be expected to differ on the desirability of lotteries with small negative expected values, Cho and Luce (1995) partitioned their 40 subjects according to the certainty equivalents that they gave to 10 screening gambles with small negative expected values. Those whose CEs were positive on 7 or more 16 of the 10 were classed as`g amblers'' and the remainder as``non-gamblers.'' There were, respectively, 16 and 24 subjects. Then in another part of the experiment we established for several [g, h] pairs certainty equivalents for g Ä h and for g V h. We concluded that for the set of gamblers, Eq. (23) is not rejected but that the common operation Ä=V fails monotonicity in the sense that the condition
was rejected. Luce (1995) showed under fairly weak conditions that Eq. (24) is equivalent to V being monotonic. For non-gamblers, we rejected Ä=V but found that V appeared to be monotonic in the sense that Eq. (24) was not rejected.
Is Joint Receipt Non-monotonic or Is PEST Not Order Preserving?
The above empirical finding is both interesting for the distinction between gamblers and non-gamblers and disturbing because it suggests that joint receipt may not be monotonic, at least for gamblers. Luce (1995) showed that under fairly weak assumptions the monotonicity of Ä is equivalent to ((x, E; e), D; e)t((x, D; e), E; e) Ronen (1971 Ronen ( , 1973 No (forced choice) Brothers (1990) OK ( Joint receipt decomposable
No empirical studies at present (x Ä y, E; e)t(x, E; e) Ä ( y, D; e)
Joint receipt consistency \(x, y, x$ e, r, s e, xÄ r e, x$ Ä r e) No empirical studies at present
In other words, a gamble can be replaced in a joint receipt by its certainty equivalent. Cho and Luce (1995) studied this by establishing for both sides of Eq. (25) their certainty equivalents, and they found that it apparently does not hold for either gamblers or non-gamblers. The conclusion we were forced to was that either Ä is not monotonic or that PEST, as currently implemented, is not order preserving. The former conclusion is certainly disturbing, if true, because all of the theory described here involving joint receipt presupposes Ä to be a monotonic operation, and I know of no theory of binary operations where monotonicity is not assumed. The latter conclusion means that we need to examine the PEST procedure with care.
Cho and Fisher (in preparation) have used choice repetitions together with PEST-determined CEs to separate the causes. Without going into the details, monotonicity seems sustained and PEST is implicated as the source of the problem. Sneddon and Luce (in preparation) have shown by simulations that PEST, as implemented, is biased in estimating the CE when the gambles are badly skewed and the psychometric function is not symmetric. Moreover, our truncation of the PEST procedure to include only sums of money within the range of consequences of a gamble, which seemed only rational, inadvertently makes all psychometric functions, including symmetric ones, into ones that are functionally asymmetric. Additional methodological studies are underway in an attempt to improve our estimates of CEs.
CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Results
Our major results are various behavioral linking conditions that force the four measures of Table 1 to be the same. These linking conditions are summarized in Table 3 along with the relevant empirical references. And Table 4 summarizes the general nature of the theoretical results.
The key links between the joint receipt and the gambling measures are segregation (Definition 8, Eq. 12) for gains and duplex decomposition (Def. 11, Eq. 16) for the mixed case. Both of these properties have been subjected to empirical study, and they appear to be sustained within the somewhat large noise levels of experiments in this area. What complicates the theoretical picture considerably is the need for the joint receipt measure also to be separable (Definition 5, Eq. 5). A new existential property called joint receipt decomposability (Definition 10, Eq. 14, for gains and Definition 12, Eq. 17 for mixed cases) was shown to be just what is needed. A final result concerns conditions when the two joint receipt measures are the same, namely, joint receipt consistency (Definition 13). This equality is proved on the assumption that each measure is separable.
Open Problems
Recall that if the joint receipt operation turns out to be associative throughout, rather than only for gains and losses separately as assumed in this paper, then the empirical and theoretical situation is much simpler (Luce, submitted) . Whether or not associativity holds in the mixed case can be decided directly and does not entail any existence issues. If it turns out to hold, then only joint receipt decomposability for gains (and for losses separately) needs to be checked because the mixed case is completely determined by the gains and losses cases.
If, however, associativity fails, then a number of theoretical and empirical problems need to be considered.
At the theoretical level the most obvious question concerns the linkage between joint receipt and gambles in the mixed case, Theorem 6, which applies only to a subset of At the empirical level, there is much to do. In reducing the general theory to the binary one, we assumed Eqs. (19) and (21), but no attempt has yet been made to verify either property. Several studies attempt to explore rank dependence directly. Perhaps the most convincing study in favor of rank dependence is Birnbaum and McIntosh (1995) . Turning to the binary situation, joint receipt decomposability (Eqs. 14 and 17) and joint receipt consistency (Definition 13) need to be investigated. Because these are conditions that involve finding elements that meet an indifference condition and then verifying that they continue to hold when one or more of the variables is varied, there is a double source for error and so it will be difficult to make these tests at all sensitive. Cho and Luce (1995) found some reassurance about our method of testing indifference in the fact that some tests were rejected while others were accepted, and these acceptances and rejections formed a consistent pattern. Achieving a similar level of confidence is likely to be considerably more difficult in these types of tests.
Finally, a major uncertainty in the approach so far taken by me and my students arises from some evidence, both indirect and direct, that PEST as currently implemented may not be order preserving for skewed gambles. This is currently under investigation.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
A1. Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 1. Assuming A3(iv), status quo event commutativity implies the Thomsen condition (Eq. 6) in ( C_E, $).
Proof. Suppose (x, F; e)t(z, E ; e) and (z, D ; e)t ( y, F; e). Using status quo event commutativity and consequence monotonicity freely, ((x, D ; e), F ; e)t((x, F ; e), D ; e) t((z, E ; e), D ; e) t((z, D; e), E ; e) t(( y, F ; e), E ; e) t(( y, E ; e), F ; e), and so (x, D ; e)t( y, E; e) follows by consequence monotonicity. K Turning now to the proof of Theorem 1 itself, monotonicity 17 is assumed in A3(iv and v) and restricted solvability in A3(vi). Essentialness that both coordinates make a difference is assured by A1(iii) and A3(vi). Lemma 1 proves that the Thomsen condition holds, and Archimedeaness is assumed. So by a well known theorem (Krantz et al., 1971, Theorem 6.2, p. 257 ) the representation exists, and it is unique up to a power transformation. K Proof of Corollary 1. By Theorem 1,
Dividing by U(x), we see that the right side is independent of x except as W k depends on whether x e or x e, so F must depend only on the sign of x. Taking inverses yields the form. K Proof of Corollary 2. Because the assumed monotonicity in p implies that W k is strictly increasing and
it is immediately obvious that W k is a power function. K A2. Proof of Theorem 2. Luce and Fishburn (1991) showed that segregation together with the binary rankdependent representation imply
It follows immediately from A2(ii) and Eq. (1a) that A=B=1. Applying this and Eq. (1a) we see that
=U(x, E; e)+U(x)+C$U(x, E; e) U(x)
and so by weak concavity (Eq. 13) C$<0. So we set C=&1ÂC$, yielding Eq. (3a). They also showed the other two implications. K &U(x, E; e) U( y, D; e) (Eq. 3a)
=U(x Ä y, E ; e). (Eq. 5)
Because U is order preserving, Eq. (14) follows. K A4. Proof of Theorem 4. Let V be any bounded separable utility function with weighting function W + and let U satisfy Eq. (3a). With no loss of generality choose the bounds of U and V to be 1. Let Eq. (14) hold and let X=V(x), Y=V( y), Z=W + (E), and P=W + (D)= P(X, Z). Then
=V(x Ä y, E ; e) (Eq. 5 on V) 
(Eq. 5 and defs.).
where G(X)=1&F(X). Substituting this into the above functional equation, we see that, for X,
Using the differentiability of F and F &1 , Acze l et al. (1996) show that for some :>0 and ;>0, 
which is property (ii).
The separability of U is immediate from (ii). So we focus on the additivity. Suppose g
e, E ; y & ). So, denoting independent realizations of E by E$ and E",
=U(x + , E ; e)+U(e, E; y & ) [(ii) and U(e)=0]
which is the additivity of Eq. (4a). So (iii) holds.
(
& , and E # E are such that g + =(x + , E$; e) and g & =(e, E"; y & ), where E$ and E" are independent realizations of E. Then,
=U(x + , E$; e)+U(e, E" ; y & ) [(ii) and U(e)=e]
which, since utility is order preserving, yields (i). K A7. Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose U is separable and
, which is possible since the weighting functions span [0, 1], (18) and is independent of x, and so the same condition holds for any x$ # C + such that x$ Ä r # C + , proving joint receipt consistency.
Conversely, suppose joint receipt consistency holds. By the fact that U and V are both increasing functions over gains, there exists some strictly increasing function which implies the negative exponential form. Suppose Eq. (A2) holds and that V is separable. We show that assuming U is also separable leads to a contradiction. Using the assumed separability of both U and V we have for Omitting the E arguments and setting X=:V(x)>0, 
